Intensiivseminar “Lõhe objektides: mõelda filosoofiliselt koos Graham Harmaniga”

16:00–18:00 “The Rift in Objects”, public lecture, followed by a conversation with Prof. Rein Raud (Tallinn University)

Ruum M-218

Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) is often described as a philosophy in which the true nature of objects withdraws from direct human access. Although technically true, this principle is already found in such modern thinkers as Kant and Heidegger, and possibly as far back as Plato Aristotle. The real key to OOO is found in the rift between an object and its own qualities, which it both has and does not have. In this lecture I will discuss the implications of this emphasis.

The lecture is held in conjunction with the release of the Estonian translation of Graham Harman’s The Quadruple Object (translated by Kalle Hein, Tallinn University Press, 2025).

10:00–12:00 Seminar on Aesthetics

Room A-206

Aesthetics has always been central to object-oriented ontology (OOO). More specifically, OOO pays close attention to the difference between the literal and the non-literal, and views philosophy (along with art) as one of the most important forms of non-literal cognition. In this seminar we will discuss the similarities and differences between OOO non-literalism and the influential philosophy of art found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment.

Reading: Graham Harman, “Why Architecture and Beauty Need Each Other”, in Tallinn Architecture Biennale TAB 2019 catalogue “Beauty Matters”. Ed. by Rebecca Collings. Tallinn: Eesti Arhitektuurikeskus, 2019.

12:00–13.30 Lunch

13:30–15:30 Seminar on Philosophy of Science

Room A-206

Philosophy has long defined knowledge as “justified true belief.” However, in some respects justification and truth are opposites. On the one hand, justifying evidence is always provisional, and evidence changes constantly even in the hard sciences, meaning that truth is never attained. On the other, those moments where we do feel in contact with truth are more likely to resemble a Pascalian wager or a Kierkegaardian leap of faith, both of which explicitly admit that they have insufficient justification. We will observe this theme at work in the philosophy of science, focusing on Popper’s falsificationist theory of science and Lakatos’s interesting modification of Popper back in the direction of verification.

Reading: Graham Harman, “On Progressive and Degenerating Research Programs With Respect to Philosophy”, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 75(4), 2019, pp. 2067–2102.